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Abstract
We provide a reason for the wider economics profession to take social
preferences, a concern for the outcomes achieved by other reference agents,
seriously. Although we show that student measures of social preference
elicited in an experiment have little external validity when compared to
measures obtained from a ﬁeld experiment with a population of partici-
pants who face a social dilemma in their daily lives (i.e., team production),
we also ﬁnd strong links between the social preferences of our ﬁeld par-
ticipants and their productivity at work.
Keywords: ﬁeld experiment, social preference, income pooling, pro-
ductivity
JEL Codes: C93, D21, D24, H41, J24, M52, M54
1 Introduction
Laboratory experiments in economics have provided overwhelming evidence that
many student participants exhibit social preferences: they care about the out-
comes achieved by reference agents in addition to their own outcomes. These
preferences include conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001) and the
propensity to punish free riders (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000b) and have been
shown to transform various social dilemmas like team production into coordi-
nation problems in which participants often achieve Pareto eﬃcient outcomes.
However, the laboratory data suﬀer two shortcomings. One problem, that has
resulted in many recent ﬁeld experiments, is that it is hard to know how well
student responses in the lab generalize to other important populations — the
external validity problem. A second related problem is that experimentalists
∗
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have provided little reason for other economists to care about social prefer-
ences. That is, showing that non-students exhibit social preferences is not the
same as showing that social preferences have an impact on economic outcomes.
1
Until experiments establish direct links in relevant populations between exper-
imental measures of social preference and economic outcomes, these ideas will
continue to have limited impact.
While there are a growing number of ﬁeld experiments to examine how well
the results of student lab experiments generalize to diﬀerent populations, there
are very few experiments that (convincingly) link behavioral measures from ex-
periments to economic outcomes, and, to our knowledge, none that accomplish
both goals. Harrison and List (2004) review the recent literature on economic
ﬁeld experiments but are mostly silent on the topic of social preferences. In other
speciﬁc experiments, Henrich (2000) and Cardenas et al. (2000) pioneered con-
ducting social preference experiments in the ﬁeld. For example, Henrich (2000)
showed that one would have to travel to Amazonia to ﬁnd participants who
look remotely like the self-interested agent that much of traditional economic
theory is built around and Cardenas et al. (2000) demonstrated how insti-
tutions can crowd out social preferences for cooperation among rural farmers
and craftspeople in Colombia. More recently, Henrich et al. (2001) extend the
earlier experiments to ﬁfteen diﬀerent cultures, Carpenter et al. (2004a) show
important diﬀerences exist between blue collar workers and students in distrib-
ution experiments, and List (2004) ﬁnds similar diﬀerences using the voluntary
contribution mechanism.
With respect to the link between social preferences and economic outcomes,
Karlan (2002) has shown that those participants who were more trustworthy in
an experiment were more likely to repay their loans a year later. Carter and
Castillo (2002) conduct trust and distribution games in South Africa and ﬁnd
that their experimental measures of altruism and trust are positively associated
with household expenditures. Cardenas and Carpenter (2003) conduct a sim-
ilar analysis of the links between experimental measures of cooperation from
public goods games played by urban slum dwellers in Vietnam and Thailand
and household expenditures and ﬁnd that more cooperative players were better
oﬀ in Thailand but not Vietnam. Lastly, and more relevant for our purposes,
Barr and Serneels (2004) ﬁnd that individual experimental measures of trust-
worthiness are positively associated with the wages of Ghanaian manufacturing
workers, however any link to productivity is only inferential.
The experiment that we report on in this paper is unique because it addresses
both shortcomings simultaneously and therefore is the ﬁrst research to directly
link standard social preferences that have been identiﬁed in hundreds of lab
experiments with topics that are at the core of economic theory. To accomplish
this goal, we conducted a series of experiments in Toyama Prefecture, Japan.
Our participants belonged to one of two groups; they were either local college
students or ﬁshermen who catch shrimp in the bay. The comparison of these
1
Fehr and Fischbacher (2002), however, provide some convincing reasons why the profession
should take lab experiments with students seriously.
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two groups provides us with a link to the social preference literature based
on traditional lab experiments and allows us to explore the external validity
of student social preferences. We also collected productivity data from our
ﬁshermen that allow us to examine whether social preferences, measured with
our experiment, have an impact on ﬁshing productivity.
The ﬁshermen we study are particularly well suited for this sort of research
because they engage in team production and they have organized themselves
into two distinct groups based on whether or not they pool their catch at the
end of the day. The ﬁrst factor implies that these ﬁshermen face social dilemma
incentives each day at work and therefore may rely on social preferences to
attenuate shirking. In other words, there is some reason to hypothesize that
social preferences will aﬀect the productivity of our ﬁshermen. The second
factor (that some ﬁshermen pool their catch) implies that the incentives for the
two groups of ﬁshermen are diﬀerent. Although each boat, pooler or not, must
contend with shirking among the crew members, this problem is compounded
for the poolers because each pooling boat also confronts the incentive to free
ride on the ﬁshing eﬀort of the other boats. This suggests that social preferences
might develop to a diﬀerent degree aboard pooling boats and/or might have a
diﬀerential eﬀect on their productivity.
We discuss the details of ﬁshing in Toyama bay in the next section of the
paper. In section 3 we describe our experiment. In section 4 we summarize
the demographic characteristics of our participants and discuss the diﬀerences
in overall experimental behavior between students, poolers and nonpoolers. In
section 5 we present our methodology for constructing measures of social prefer-
ence from the experimental data. In section 6 we ask whether the distributions of
social preference diﬀer based on whether our ﬁshermen pool or not and whether
these diﬀerences can be attributed to a treatment eﬀect of pooling on ﬁshermen
preferences. In section 7 we present our main results that link social preferences
to ﬁshing productivity and we oﬀer a few concluding remarks in section 8.
2 Shiroebi Fishing in Toyama Prefecture
Toyama prefecture, located on the west coast of the Honsyu main island of
Japan, has a semi-urban local economy dominated by traditional ﬁshing indus-
tries that prosper because of their proximity to the large urban markets of Tokyo
and Osaka. Toyama Bay, opening into the Sea of Japan, is known for a large
variety of highly valued ﬁsh species because of the complex structure of the sea
bottom and a mixture of warm and cold currents ﬂowing into the bay. There
are 16 small ﬁshing communities situated along the coast including our base,
Shinminato.
Coastal ﬁsheries in Japan are managed by Fishery Cooperative Associations
(FCAs). Local FCAs do not only implement and enforce national and prefec-
tural legislation, they also devise complementary regulations that are designed
speciﬁcally to deal with evolving local conditions. Within each FCA, ﬁshermen
are grouped according to the species they target and/or the ﬁshing technologies
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that they use. The ﬁshermen that we study belong to the ebi self-managing
group that specializes in shrimp ﬁshing. Shiroebi (Japanese glass shrimp) ﬁsh-
ing takes place between April and October — the season authorized by the FCAs.
For the rest of the year, the ﬁshermen are engaged in trawl ﬁshing of crabs and
cold-water shrimp (Akaebi). Before the late 1980s, shiroebi ﬁshing was regarded
as an auxiliary activity for the summer months by some of the ﬁshermen.
The ﬁshermen who catch shiroebi in the bay near Shinminato are organized
into two groups. The members of the two groups live in Shinminato, belong
to the same local FCA, use the same harbor facilities, and operate in the same
ﬁshery. However, there are two major diﬀerences between these groups: whether
or not they pool their catch and their experience in shiroebi ﬁshing. One group,
consisting of seven boats and 30 ﬁshermen (7 skippers, 21 crew members, and 2
onshore helpers) whom we call poolers, have been ﬁshing shiroebi for generations
and have shared both income and operating expenses since the 1960s.
2
The
second group, which we call the nonpoolers, consists of 5 ﬁshing boats and 30
ﬁshermen (5 skippers and 25 crewmen). Members of this second group do not
pool income or expenses and began shiroebi ﬁshing only in 1992.
Since the motorization of ﬁshing boats in the early 1930’s, competition
among ﬁshing units for access to the shiroebi stock has become a chronic prob-
lem. Many anecdotal stories testify to heavy congestion in the most favor-
able ﬁshing spots, over-extraction, and frequent interpersonal conﬂicts. The
early 1960’s witnessed the implementation of advanced ﬁshing equipment such
as the echo-sounder (a.k.a., sonar), sophisticated navigation systems, and syn-
thetic nets. The echo-sounder increased precision in detecting stock concentra-
tions. Satellite-driven navigation systems have allowed skippers to remember
and travel quickly to good ﬁshing areas, as well as to operate under bad condi-
tions. Synthetic materials allowed the ﬁshermen to use larger nets and increase
their average catch per haul.
At the same time however, the adoption of sophisticated and highly eﬀective
technical equipment by an ever larger number of competing ﬁshermen led to
more conﬂicts over the limited ﬁshing spots. As a result, the catch per unit of
eﬀort (i.e., the kilos caught per trip into the bay) started to decline and the
amount of net damage increased because the new synthetic materials embold-
ened skippers to take more risks. If these problems were not enough, during
the same period ﬁshermen in Toyama Bay increasingly suﬀered from active col-
lusion among the ﬁsh merchants and middlemen. Ample opportunities existed
for the merchants to collude and force ﬁshermen to sell their catch at lower
prices. To protest (and to increase their market power) the ﬁshermen boycotted
the traders’ cartels in 1961 and pressured the FCA to organize ﬁsh auctions
with the hope of increasing merchant competition. This demand was met and
resulted in the demise of the merchant cartel.
It was immediately after the success of this collective protest, that the shi-
roebi ﬁshermen in Shinminato organized and adopted the pooling system that
2
More speciﬁcally, poolers share both income and operating expenses, but in terms of cap-
ital investments, only costs of nets are borne by the whole group; boats and other equipment
are individually ﬁnanced.
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has been maintained until now. For thirty years the poolers were the only
shiroebi ﬁshers operating in Shinminato. This arrangement ended with the en-
trance of the nonpoolers in 1992. The nonpoolers, used to continue to harvest
Akaebi and Toyama ebi between June and September. Since the mid 1980’s,
however, the economic importance of these ﬁsheries has declined due to de-
pressed unit prices for Akaebi and to the extinction of other species. Concur-
rently, shiroebi ﬁshing beneﬁted from the growing demand for fresh products
due mostly to advancements in refrigerated transportation to the urban con-
sumption centers. These events prompted the nonpoolers to request permission
from the local FCA to begin ﬁshing shiroebi. After six long years of negoti-
ation with the poolers under the auspices of the local FCA, an arrangement
was settled on under which the nonpolers were allowed to ﬁsh shiroebi on Tues-
days, Thursdays, and Saturdays between June and September while the poolers
limited themselves to ﬁshing on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.
Daily ﬁshing operations start before sunrise (between 3:00 and 4:00 am)
when all the boats belonging to the group set oﬀ. On any given ﬁshing day,
each boat will make a maximum of four or ﬁve hauls. Each haul takes about
two hours to complete. A single haul consists of the following tasks. Once they
have left the harbor, each skipper starts to search for promising ﬁshing spots
using his echo-sounder and radar. The skipper may record his position with the
help of a global positioning satellite system. Among the poolers, one of the se-
nior skippers is experienced in identifying the promising areas. This individual
advantage generates externalities for all pooling boats because the pooling skip-
pers exchange information by radio. There is no such cooperation among the
nonpooling skippers who actually take measures to conceal information about
favorable ﬁshing spots.
The ﬁshing technique is called purse seining : each boat sets its net by en-
circling an area of concentration and then allows the net to drift. The shrimp
gather at the end of the net after dragging it for some time at the appropriate
speed. Success requires taking account of the current and seabed. Because the
seabed in Toyama Bay is highly variable and the large net will be spread over
a considerable distance (a rectangle approximately 100 by 200 meters), it be-
comes crucial to monitor the position of the net to target the stock accurately
while avoiding ensnaring the net and damaging it. Damaged nets are very costly
because they are complicated to repair and the opportunity cost of net repair
time is very high.
To improve the precision of targeting stock concentrations and avoid dam-
aging nets, the poolers occasionally adopt pair-ﬁshing. The skipper of one boat
sets his net while another skipper positions his boat above the net. The skipper
of the second boat can then closely monitor the location of the ﬁsh and the
position of the net with his echo-sounder. Likewise, he can give the skipper on
the net-laying boat instructions about the desirable speed and duration of drift.
After trawling for some time, the crew gradually reels in the net and removes
the shrimp. The shrimp are stored in containers of iced water for the journey
back to port. This journey is competed as quickly as possible to avoid deterio-
ration of the catch. Once in port, the haul is weighed and transferred directly
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to the traders (i.e., auctioneers). All landings must be completed by 1pm which
is the time of the ﬁnal auction for the day.
As hinted at above, the poolers face diﬀerent incentives. On one hand,
pooling provides the same eﬀort problems as team production: each crew has
the incentive to free ride oﬀ the eﬀorts of the other crews. On the other hand,
the poolers also have the incentive to share information and ﬁsh cooperatively.
Indeed, poolers exhibit more cooperation in terms of work coordination, eﬀort
regulation, and the sharing of information and expertise. In addition to pair-
ﬁshing, work coordination includes concerted searches for stock, coordination of
access to ﬁshing spots, and collective net maintenance (including the search for
lost nets). In addition, collective eﬀort regulation prevents individual ﬁshermen
from unproﬁtable overproduction and sharing information and expertise enables
all the poolers to take advantage of individual research on innovative ﬁshing
techniques.
The pooler’s coordination seems to yield productivity gains. In terms of their
ﬁshing eﬀectiveness, poolers tend to catch more than nonpoolers.
3
This diﬀer-
ence was ﬁrst recognized in Platteau and Seki (1998) and was conﬁrmed almost
ﬁve years later during our stay in Shinminato, because one of us (Erika Seki)
collected data on individual hauls from 115 trips into the bay. Our estimation
of the ﬁshing production function discussed in more detail in section 7 suggests
that poolers typically catch 0.4 standard deviations more than nonpoolers and
this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
While we suspect that the teamwork that poolers engage in at the boat level
accounts for much of this diﬀerence in productivity, we also wondered whether
social preferences could also explain the diﬀerence. Indeed, our extensive inter-
views with skippers and crewmen provide the foundation for this hypothesis.
In these interviews, ﬁshermen spoke freely about their professional lives and
their interactions with the other ﬁshermen. They expressed opinions not only
regarding technical and environmental aspects of their work but also regarding
the social and economic aspects of their experiences with pooling. As a matter
of fact, a number of statements made by the ﬁshermen indicate the emergence
of inter-personal comparisons of productivity and social preferences for coopera-
tive behavior among the poolers.
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With these interviews in mind, and informed
by Bowles (1998), we hypothesized that cooperative social preferences (e.g., the
3
The poolers’ better performance is not limited to their productivity. During the months in
which they ﬁsh for shiroebi by themselves (April and May), the poolers are eﬀective at acting
collectively as a monopolist and have become skilled at price discrimination. Therefore, the
poolers also have higher average monthly revenues. This aspect of the diﬀerence between
poolers and nonpoolers is analyzed in depth in Seki (2004). Our current analysis uses data
from the period in which both groups are active. During this period the two groups compete
for larger hauls.
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Here are a few of the statements purporting the emergence of cooperative preferences:
“Because we pool landings, I always feel under pressure to having good catches”; “It is out
of the question to become lazy because we share income. On the contrary, income pooling
prompts me to work more thoughtfully”; “Fishers with higher catches will be indiﬀerent about
(i.e., will not disapprove of ) those with lower catches. On the contrary, the former will help
the latter to improve by teaching them where the better spots to ﬁsh are.”; “We (poolers)
have team sprit to perform better as a whole.”
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propensities to cooperate, punish free riding, and respond prosocially to pun-
ishment) might evolve to a greater extent on the pooling boats and that these
preferences might contribute to higher productivity. To test this hypothesis, we
conducted a ﬁeld experiment to measure the social preferences of the ﬁshermen.
3 Our Field Experimental Design
As we described in the previous section, our ﬁshermen rely on teamwork to
catch shrimp and therefore may face the problem of shirking. To increase the
external validity of our results, and perhaps the saliency of the protocol for
our participants, we choose an experiment to simulate the incentives that these
participants face on their boats. This motivation lead us to use the experiment
ﬁrst discussed in Carpenter et al. (2004b) and Carpenter et al. (2003) which
combines a standard, hand-run, version of the familiar repeated voluntary con-
tribution mechanism (VCM) with a modiﬁcation in which participants can pay
to show their disapproval of the contribution behavior of the other members
of the group. Because theorists have shown that this sort of disapproval and
the resulting shame can attenuate the incentive to shirk in teams (e.g., Kandel
and Lazear, 1992), we decided that the “social disapproval” game best suited
our purposes. The game allowed us to gather data on the willingness of team
members to show their disapproval and their responsiveness to displayed dis-
approval, in addition to the contribution data that is typically collected in the
VCM.
In our version of the social disapproval experiment, participants were di-
vided into four person groups that maintained the same membership for ten
rounds. Each group member was endowed with ten 50 yen coins and was asked
to privately contribute as many coins as (s)he wanted to a public good (i.e.,
the experiment was single blind). At the time we conducted the experiments
(August and September, 2003) the per-round endowment was equal to $4.30
which was a substantial sum for our participants.
5
Once all the participants
had made their contribution decisions, the total contribution was calculated for
each group, each group total was doubled, and then the proceeds were distrib-
uted equally to the group members. This implies that the marginal per capita
return from the public good was 0.5: each coin contributed was doubled by the
experimenters and then divided four ways. Because the marginal return to con-
tributing a coin is lower than the payoﬀ to keeping the coin, and this calculus
does not depend on the level of group contributions, the dominant strategy is
to contribute nothing even though the team doubles their money when they all
contribute fully.
The ﬁrst ﬁve rounds of the experiment replicated the VCM and then in the
last ﬁve rounds we instituted the social dilemma protocol. When the ﬁrst round
began, the participants were unaware of how the protocol would change after
round ﬁve. We choose this design feature so that behavior in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds
5
In fact, the experiment typically lasted less than an hour and our participants earned
$73.19, on average.
7
would not be confounded by the anticipation of the rule change. The ﬁrst ﬁve
rounds followed a hand-run protocol that is now standard in the literature (see
Ledyard, 1995) and the instructions for both segments that appear in Appendix
A), but the social disapproval institution is an innovationthat is importnt to
discuss in some detail.
During the social disapproval rounds, the ﬁrst half of the protocol proceeded
exactly as in the standard VCM. Participants decided how much of their endow-
ment to contribute and then were informed of the group total contribution (and
shown the individual contributions in random order) and their payoﬀ from the
public good. After being shown the distribution of contributions and the group
total contribution, participants were asked if they wanted to anonymously send
a signal to the rest of the group. This signal, an unhappy face (which has a simi-
lar connotation in Japanese culture) cost ten yen and was displayed for everyone
in the group to see at the beginning of the next round. Therefore, at the be-
ginning of rounds 7 through 10, each group member saw between zero and four
unhappy faces that signaled the number of group members who were unhappy
with the level of the public good or the distribution of individual contributions
provided in the previous round.
While the social disapproval protocol has the ﬂavor of the punishment ex-
periments described in Fehr and Gaechter (2000a) and Carpenter (2004), for
example, it is substantially diﬀerent because punishment carries no material
penalty (a la Masclet et al., 2003) and it is not directed at individuals (which
would be hard to implement by hand in the ﬁeld for more than one round).
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At the same time, the simplicity of the protocol is elegant because the stark
incentives make it clear that there are no strategic reasons to send a signal
and if people do send signals (and respond to them) then we have particularly
compelling measures of social preference.
We conducted four sessions of the experiment with 53 participants. To
provide a link to the standard experimental literature, 26 of these participants
were students recruited from nearby universities.
7
The two ﬁshermen sessions
took place in a large meeting room at the ﬁshing coop and the two student
sessions were conducted in a large conference room that we rented at a local
hotel. The procedures were single blind anonymous and our participants made
6
There is an important diﬀerence between our social disapproval protocol and the Masclet
et al. (2003) experiment. In Masclet et al., it was free to send signals which implies that
there are many equilibria in which punishment is a component. By imposing a cost, the social
disapproval protocol assures that the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the underlying game
is the same as in the VCM. Speciﬁcally, the cost associated with sending a signal motivates
participants to free ride oﬀ any disapproval done by the other group members and, as a result,
no signals should be sent. Additionally, social disapproval imposes no monetary penalty which
implies egoistic participants should ignore it. Combined these incentives suggest the dominant
strategy is to free ride at both opportunities.
7
Neither 53 nor 26 is evenly divisible by four. In three cases we did not want to turn away
participants from our limited subject pools because we did not have enough people to form
another group of four. Instead, we relied on the fact that participants could not know who
the other members of their group were and formed groups with “shadow members.” These
randomly chosen shadow members contributed to their own group but their behavior was also
counted in another group to get the total up to four persons.
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their decisions privately behind portable blinds that we constructed.
8
At the
beginning of each round, participants were given envelopes with ten 50 yen coins
inside. We decided to use endowments of real money to make the choices as
salient as possible. The ﬁrst decision for each individual was to transfer as many
of the coins as he wanted from the small endowment envelop to a large opaque
envelop. When everyone was ﬁnished, the experimenters collected the small
envelopes and computed the distribution of contributions and the group total
contributions. On slips of paper, the experimenters wrote, in random order, the
individual contributions to the public good, the group total contribution, and
the individual payout from the public good. These slips were distributed to the
participants as feedback. While the participants were making their decisions,
the third experimenter entered the data into a laptop so that it would be fast and
easy to calculate each participant’s ﬁnal payoﬀ at the end of the experiment.
9
At the end of round ﬁve the experiment was interrupted and the social dis-
approval protocol was explained. Participants made their contribution decisions
and received feedback on the behavior of their group as before, but then they
were given slips of paper on which they indicated whether they wanted to send
a signal (at a cost of 10 yen) to the group or not. To display the signals, we
stamped between zero and four unhappy faces on the front of the smaller en-
dowment envelopes at the beginning of the next round. Therefore, at time t
each participant saw n signals that indicated that n members of the group were
unhappy with how much the group contributed in period t− 1.
4 A Summary of our Participants and their Group-
Level Behavior
After the experiment was completed and while we calculated the ﬁnal payoﬀs,
the participants completed a demographic and attitudinal survey. The top panel
of Table 1 presents summary statistics from this survey. We gathered informa-
tion on family size, ﬁshing experience, two personality measures, two measures
of our ﬁshermen’s attitudes towards each other, and a measure of the ﬁshermen’s
competitiveness. Nonpoolers come from signiﬁcantly larger families than pool-
ers (p
t
= 0.02) but the mean family size of the ﬁshermen, taken together, is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of the students (p
t
= 0.56). Although the pool-
ers have been ﬁshing for shiroebi longer than the nonpoolers, the average total
ﬁshing experience of the two groups is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p
t
= 0.35).
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The cooperation scale is comprised of four statements to which respondents
either agreed, disagreed or oﬀered no response. The scale generates a score
between —4 and 4 and those participants with more cooperative predispositions
8
We owe a large debt of gratitude to our insightful research assistant, Kiyoshi Yokoo who
not only helped us streamline our procedures, but was rock-solid during the experiments.
9
The opportunity cost of ﬁsherman time is extremely high and therefore we settled on
procedures that made the experiment run as quickly as possible.
10
All the p
t
-values presented in our discussion of summary statistics come from two-tailed
t-tests.
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(e.g., they believe cooperation and reciprocity are virtuous) have higher scores.
The Rotter score is based on the general scale ﬁrst developed in Rotter (1966)
which was constructed to capture individual diﬀerences in “locus of control.”
Individuals with an internal orientation, or locus of control, tend to believe that
they create opportunities and that their own agency determines their fate. On
the other hand, individuals with an external orientation believe in fate and that
they are simply a small cog in some larger machine. In our implementation,
respondents with higher Rotter scores are more internally oriented. The exact
statements for each personality scale appear in Appendix B. As we anticipated,
poolers have more cooperative personalities than nonpoolers but the diﬀerence
is only marginally signiﬁcant (p
t
= 0.08) and the students are neither more nor
less cooperatively oriented than the ﬁshermen (p
t
= 0.23). Likewise, although
the poolers tend to be more internally oriented than the nonpoolers, we found
no signiﬁcant pair-wise diﬀerence in locus of control when comparing poolers or
nonpoolers (p
t
= 0.14) or when comparing students and ﬁshermen (p
t
= 0.54).
We also asked our ﬁshermen about their conversations with other ﬁsher-
men. Respondents could indicate an intimacy of discussion that ranged from
rarely speaking to other ﬁshermen to an active exchange of opinions. Most
ﬁshermen responded that they had frequent active exchanges with other ﬁsher-
men and there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between poolers and nonpoolers
(p
t
= 0.29). The second attitudinal question we asked the ﬁshermen was how
they considered the other ﬁshermen. They could categorize other ﬁshermen as
competitors, strangers, friends or like family. Here we do ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant
diﬀerences that make sense. Most poolers consider other ﬁshermen friends and
most nonpoolers consider them competitors. The mean attitude is diﬀerent at
better than the 1% level. Lastly, we were curious about how competitive the
ﬁshermen were towards each other. Therefore, we asked them how interested
they were in the productivity of the other boats. It was no surprise to ﬁnd that
both groups were very interested and there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in their
mean interest (p
t
= 0.38).
The lower panel of Table 1 lists summary statistics from the experiment.
Combining all ten periods, poolers do cooperate slightly more than nonpoolers
(p
t
= 0.10) and, taken together, the ﬁshermen cooperate much more than the
students (p
t
< 0.01). For that matter, pooled student reactions are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent in each of the four comparisons of experimental behavior at better than
the 1% level indicating that there may be problems generalizing from student
behavior to ﬁeld behavior. Much of the diﬀerence in contributions between pool-
ers and nonpoolers is the result of the social disapproval treatment. A test of
the pre-disapproval contributions shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p
t
= 0.25), but
the post-disapproval contributions are highly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p
t
< 0.01)
which suggests that poolers were more sensitive to social disapproval than non-
poolers were. Concerning social disapproval, we ﬁnd that our participants were
willing to pay to show their disapproval, despite there being no material incen-
tive to do so. Students show more disapproval than ﬁshermen and nonpoolers
show disapproval more frequently than poolers (p
t
= 0.02), but these diﬀerences
are confounded by the fact that poolers contribute more than nonpoolers and
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ﬁshermen contribute more than students.
To give the reader a sense of the dynamics of the experimental behavior,
Figure 1 plots the mean contribution by round in panel (a) and the frequency of
social disapproval in panel (b). As hinted at by Table 1, the contribution levels
of the poolers and nonpoolers are similar for the ﬁrst ﬁve periods but start
to bifurcate after social disapproval is instituted. Starting in round 7 pooler
contribution levels begin to increase and in round 8 the nonpooler contribution
levels drop dramatically. By comparison, the student contribution levels are
relatively low but ﬂat over the course of the entire experiment; however they do
show a large endgame eﬀect. We see that the student frequency of disapproval
falls slightly over time, perhaps because it is obvious that it is not having an
eﬀect. Initially, the nonpoolers frequency of disapproval increases with free
riding, but then the nonpoolers seem to also give up in round 8. Meanwhile,
the poolers disapprove steady between 10 and 20 percent of the time.
Table 2 provides a more structured test for diﬀerences in contributions at
the group level. In column (1) we regress the group’s total contribution in round
t on indicator variables for pooling and being a student and ﬁnd evidence of
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in both cases. However, column (1) does not account for
the panel nature of the contributions data. In column (2) we add group-level
random eﬀects which increases the standard error on the pooler point estimate
to the point where the coeﬃcient is no longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Further, the random eﬀects account for 34% of the overall variation in group
contributions and the chi-squared test of whether the panel estimate is diﬀerent
from the pooled estimate is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In sum, pooler groups
do not robustly contribute more, but student groups do contribute 6.269 coins
less than the omitted category, the ﬁshermen who do not pool.
11
5 Constructing Measures of Social Preference
Our goal is to use the data from our experiment to construct measures of social
preference that we can link to ﬁshing outcomes. Perhaps the simplest measures
of cooperation and the willingness to show social disapproval that one could
construct would be participant means from the pooled data. However, the more
nuanced explorations of social preferences have demonstrated that the reactions
of participants to what other participants do or to the anticipation of what
other participants will do is just as important (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002
or Falk et al., 2003). Simple means can not capture these reactions. To be
comprehensive, we develop measures that reﬂect the reactions of participants to
what others in his group have done and measures that account for unconditional
predispositions.
Our ﬁrst measure of social preference is the most obvious. For each individual
we regress the person’s contribution in round t on the total contribution of
11
The diﬀerences we ﬁnd between student behavior and the behavior of non-students echo
other VCM results discussed in List (2004) and Carpenter et al. (2003) and echo the sentiment
that student social preference results do not have much external validity.
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everyone else in the group in the previous round. The resulting coeﬃcient,
which we call conditional cooperation, can take positive values meaning that the
participant contributes more in reaction to demonstrated cooperativeness, it can
be zero indicating that the participant follows some self-imposed "dominant
strategy" (which need not be to contribute nothing), or it can be negative
indicating that the participant shirks more when he expects the others to be
particularly cooperative. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne conditional cooperation to be
β
CC
i
in the following regression:
C
i,t
= β
0
i
+ β
CC
i
(
∑
C
−i,t−1
)
+ 
i,t
where C
i,t
is individual i’s contribution in round t, β
0
i
is an intercept,
∑
C
−i,t−1
is the total contribution of the other three group members in period t− 1, and
 
i,t
is an error term. Notice that β
0
i
might be interpreted as the individual’s
predisposition to cooperate. For example, a participant who has a relatively low
level of conditional cooperation but has a large intercept could be thought of as
more altruistic. With this in mind, we deﬁne β
0
i
as a measure of individual i’s
unconditional cooperation.
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The second measure of social preference that we consider is the propensity of
each participant to show disapproval of the amount that the other three group
members kept for themselves. To construct this measure, we regress whether
or not participant i buys an unhappy face in round t on the total number
of coins that the rest of the group kept in round t. Positive coeﬃcients on
the amount kept by the rest of the group indicate that participant i is more
likely to disapprove when the others keep more, a zero coeﬃcient indicates the
participant does not condition his disapproval on the allocation decisions of the
others, and a negative coeﬃcient indicates that the participant is more likely to
show disapproval when the amount kept is high. The resulting linear probability
model takes the following form:
D
i,t
= α
0
i
+ α
PTD
i
(
30−
∑
C
−i,t
)
+ δ
i,t
where D
i,t
is an indicator variable that takes the value of one when participant i
purchases an unhappy face, α
0
i
is an intercept, α
PTD
i
is individual i’s propensity
to show disapproval, and the last item is another error term.
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For our third measure of social preference, we redid our conditional coop-
eration regressions with an additional regressor, the total number of unhappy
faces participant i saw in the previous round. We call the coeﬃcient on the new
12
The alternative way to create such measures of cooperation would be to pool the data
across individuals and then calculate a pooled beta. From the pooled beta, one could predict
contribution levels for each individual. While this would increase the degrees of freedom of
(and therefore tighten) the estimate substantially, it would also eﬀectively defeat the purpose
because the predicted values would assume the same structure of social preference for each
participant. It is the heterogeneity of preferences that we are interested in.
13
In this case the intercept only really mattered when an individual’s propensity to dis-
approve was zero which indicated that the participant either never disapproved or always
disapproved. In the few cases where the participant always disapproved, we recoded the
participant’s propensity as one.
12
regressor, participant i’s response to disapproval. This measure is interesting
because participants can react pro- or anti-socially to collective shunning. A
positive coeﬃcient suggests that participant i contributes more when the group
has been shunned and a negative coeﬃcient indicates that participant i reacts
spitefully to disapproval. To create our measures of i’s response to social disap-
proval we ran the following at the individual level:
C
i,t
= b
0
i
+ b
CC
i
(
∑
C
−i,t−1
)
+ β
RTD
i
(
∑
D
i,t−1
)
+ u
i,t
where the ﬁrst three terms replicate the conditional cooperation regression and
β
RTD
i
is our measure of i’s response to the total number of unhappy faces he saw
at the beginning of the round,
∑
D
i,t−1
.
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As with the conditional cooperation
measure, the intercept in the above regression is informative and therefore we
call b
0
i
participant i’s unconditional cooperation controlling for one’s reaction to
disapproval, which we abbreviate to i’s unconditional response.
The ﬁve panels of Figure 2 illustrate the cumulative distributions (cdfs) of
the ﬁve social preference measures. To foster comparisons, we include cdfs for
poolers, nonpoolers, and students. Beginning with conditional cooperation in
panel (a), it appears that students and nonpoolers are more conditionally coop-
erative than poolers which presents a puzzle because we expected the poolers
to be more cooperative. The puzzle is "solved," however, when one considers
the unconditional cooperation cdfs in panel (b). The poolers have higher levels
of unconditional cooperation than either nonpoolers or students.
Panel (c) indicates that close to 40% of each population never showed dis-
approval, but considering only positive propensities to disapprove, it appears
that students are more likely to disapprove than nonpoolers or poolers when
the rest of the group increases the amount of coins that they keep. Recall that
we suggested that the diﬀerences in the frequency of disapproval illustrated in
panel (b) of Figure 1 could be due to diﬀerences in contribution rates. It seems
that this explanation is not the full story because the same diﬀerences arise
when we control for the amount of free riding in the group. Considering only
the negative propensities, we ﬁnd that approximately 20% of students and non-
poolers are actually more likely to show disapproval when others contribute a
lot. By contrast, fewer than 10% of poolers engage in such behavior.
One reason for the low contributions in the student groups (again, recall
Figure 1) is that many of the students did not respond prosocially to disap-
proval. As one can see in panel (d) of Figure 2, more than half of the students
had zero response to disapproval coeﬃcients. The incidence of zeros is far lower
among the ﬁshermen. Only 10% of the poolers and 15% of the nonpoolers do
not respond. However, of more interest is the fact that most of the poolers
have positive response to punishment coeﬃcients while 70% of the nonpoolers
have negative reactions to social disapproval. This suggest that the reason that
14
The reason we did not simply use the coeﬃcient on the lagged contributions of the other
group members from this contribution regression (i.e., b
CC
i
) as our measure of conditional
cooperation is that this regression doesn’t utilize the data from the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds of the
experiment.
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contributions fall among nonpoolers and rise among poolers is that nonpoolers
respond spitefully to social disapproval while poolers take it as a signal to con-
tribute more. As is the case when one compares panels (a) and (b) the constants
in the response to disapproval regressions (panel (e)) are mirror images of the
coeﬃcients on the lagged disapproval cdfs in panel (d).
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6 Is there a Treatment Eﬀect of Pooling on So-
cial Preferences?
Before addressing our main hypothesis, that social preferences can partially
explain the variation in ﬁshing productivity, we will discuss a related issue mo-
tivated by the discussion of endogenous preferences in Bowles (1998): are any
of the diﬀerences that we saw in the distributions of social preference due to
exposure to the pooling institution. While it would be interesting to know what
portion of the diﬀerences are due to treatment and what portion are due to
selection, because our participants have been ﬁshing for some time it is impos-
sible to accurately assess any selection eﬀects. That is, to properly identify
selection eﬀects we would need to assess the impact of social preferences (at
their level when the individual begins ﬁshing) on the decision of what boat
to join, but such an analysis is impossible because only 7 ﬁshermen have less
than 15 years of experience and they all choose to pool.
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At the same time
we can take advantage of our survey to conduct a very straightforward test for
treatment eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, if social preferences are acquired (or maintained)
diﬀerentially on pooling boats than on nonpooling boats, then we should see
a correlation between years of experience with pooling and the levels of social
preference.
Table 3 reports the results of our treatment analysis for each of the ﬁve
social preference measures. Because the scales of the social preference measures
vary so much we report standardized regression coeﬃcients.
17
Overall, we see
that controlling for experience, whether or not the individual is a boat skipper,
our two personality measures, and our two measures of associations, there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the levels of social preference between poolers and non-
poolers. As hinted at in Figure 2, poolers are less conditionally cooperative
(p < 0.05), but more unconditionally cooperative (p < 0.05); poolers have
lower propensities to punish (p < 0.001), respond signiﬁcantly more prosocially
15
We do not report test statistics for diﬀerences in the social preference cdfs. Controlled
(parametric) tests are performed in the next section and indicate that all the diﬀerences we
discussed above are statistically signiﬁcant.
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Despite the confounding eﬀect of experience, we did explore selection by regressing
whether an individual was on a pooling boat or not on the ﬁve measures of social preference
and found that none of the coeﬃcients were signiﬁcant. If one assumes that social preferences
are stable (an assumption we are not prepared to make), then we have found no evidence of
selection.
17
That is, the interpretation of the coeﬃcients in Table 3 (and Table 4) is the number
of standard deviations that the dependent variable changes when the independent variable
increases by one standard deviation.
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to social disapproval (p < 0.10), and have lower unconditional responses to
disapproval (p < 0.05).
We also ﬁnd that experience is correlated with three of the ﬁve social pref-
erence measures. The baseline eﬀect of experience is to reduce conditional co-
operation, increase unconditional cooperation, and reduce one’s propensity to
show disapproval, but experience does not appear to aﬀect one’s reaction to
social disapproval. In general, two of the reactive measures of social preference,
conditional cooperation and the propensity to disapprove, seem to decay with
experience. At the same time, however, we also ﬁnd signiﬁcant treatment ef-
fects of pooling that counteract the overall decay of these two reactive measures
of social preference. The diﬀerential eﬀect of pooling on conditional coopera-
tion is positive (p < 0.05), the eﬀect on unconditional cooperation is negative
(p < 0.05), the eﬀect on the propensity to disapprove is positive (p < 0.01), and
the coeﬃcients on these interactions almost completely counteract the baseline
eﬀects. In other words, we have uncovered evidence that social preferences are
endogenous: the pooling institution attenuates the natural erosion of two of our
three reactive measures of social preference.
There are two other interesting facts that arise from our examination of
treatment eﬀects. First, we ﬁnd that boat skippers are diﬀerent in interesting
ways. Skippers are more conditionally cooperative (0.57 standard deviations
more than crew members), less unconditionally cooperative (0.48 standard de-
viations less), show higher propensities to disapprove (0.86 standard deviations
higher), and are less responsive to disapproval (0.55 standard deviations less).
In other words, boat captains are more willing to cooperate when their crew
does, are not hesitant to inform the crew that free riding will not be tolerated,
but react more spitefully when they are publicly shamed.
The second ancillary ﬁnding that we have uncovered in Table 3 is that the
Rotter score is correlated with our social preference measures. Those ﬁshermen
who are most internally-oriented are less conditionally cooperative, have higher
propensities to disapprove, and are more unconditionally responsive to social
disapproval. These correlations will become more useful in our analysis of ﬁshing
productivity.
7 Do Social Preferences Belong in the Produc-
tion Function?
In this section we examine the links between social preferences and ﬁshing pro-
ductivity. We have two goals First, we seek to make a general methodological
point. Demonstrating that social preferences have a direct eﬀect on worker
productivity provides a much needed link between the extensive laboratory lit-
erature on social preferences and the economic mainstream. Our second, more
modest, goal is to test if the productivity gains accruing to poolers are due
entirely to structural factors (e.g., pair-ﬁshing) or if there is a diﬀerential pro-
social eﬀect of social preferences on the work eﬀort of pooling ﬁshermen that
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explains part of this productivity gap.
As mentioned brieﬂy in section 2, we gathered haul data from 115 trips into
the bay by the 12 boats in the two groups. There is considerable variation in the
amount of shiroebi that boats return to harbor with. For example, we witnesses
eight instances where the boats caught nothing. Overall however, the mean
catch per unit eﬀort is 89.94 kilos with a standard deviation of 75.54 kilos.
We estimated a series of ﬁshing production functions and report the results
in Table 4. Included in our estimates are all the important factors of production
(informed by our discussion with skippers and our experience aboard a number
of the boats) that actually vary signiﬁcantly between poolers and nonpoolers.
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First, we include the boat skipper’s years of experience as a skipper. It takes
many years to learn the seabed, where the best ﬁshing spots are (something
that can vary by season), and how best to manage your crew. Therefore, we
anticipated that boats with skippers who have considerable experience would be
more productive. At the same time, young skippers may be more amenable to,
and adept at, taking advantage of new technologies, even thought they may not
be as skilled in the basics as the older skippers. With both of these rationales
in mind, we hypothesized that the eﬀect of the Skipper’s Experience might be
concave which caused us to include Skipper Experience
2
. For the same reasons,
we expected that the average experience of the crew would matter.
19
The horse
power of the boat’s engine is important because it determines the size of the
net that can be used, the speed of trawling, the extent of the search, and the
speed back to port. To capture the structural factors that make poolers more
productive, we included the indicator variable, Pool Revenues.
All our estimates utilize the Tobit estimator because some boats return to
port without any ﬁsh. Since our social preferences are measured on such diﬀer-
ent scales (see Figure 2), we report standardized regression coeﬃcients through-
out to make our point estimates more comparable. To control for un-modeled
weather or demand factors, we included ﬁshing week ﬁxed eﬀects in each re-
gression.
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We also we explored including boat random eﬀects but did not add
them because the panel variance component in the basic production function
was not important (i.e., 5% of the total).
As one can see from Column (1) of Table 4, ﬁshing productivity does appear
to be concave in skipper experience (p < 0.05 for the linear term and p <
0.10 for the squared term). In fact, using the non-standardized coeﬃcients,
our estimate suggests that skippers with 36 years of experience are the most
productive captains. The mean crew experience, on the other hand, does not
seem to matter signiﬁcantly, although the coeﬃcient is positive.
21
As expected,
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For example, both poolers and nonpoolers use the same sort of net and therefore this
factor is controlled for naturally.
19
This intuition did not seem to be correct, as one can see from Table 4, the coeﬃcient
on mean crew experience is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero only once and when we tried the
squared term it added nothing to the analysis.
20
We can not use ﬁshing day ﬁxed eﬀects because poolers and nonpoolers alternate ﬁshing
days and therefore the ﬁxed eﬀects would be perfectly correlated with our pooling indicator
variable.
21
We also tried using the standard deviation of the crew experience instead, but it did not
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the horse power of the boat is positively associated with the amount of ﬁsh
caught (p < 0.01). Finally, controlling for all the other important factors of
production, we see that poolers tend to catch 0.404 standard deviations (or 30
kilos) more than nonpoolers (p < 0.01).
In columns (2) through (4) we add the boat mean values of our social pref-
erences to the basic production function. We add our reactive measures one
at a time since they are highly correlated with each other. We also add our
two unconditional measures at the same time as their respective reactive mea-
sures because we are interested in whether the reactive measures predict when
we control for unconditional predispositions. Overall, we see that adding so-
cial preferences improves the estimates (i.e., the log likelihoods are higher), the
direct eﬀect of each social preference on productivity is signiﬁcant, and the
interactions of social preference and pooling soak up some of the variance in
productivity that had been attributed to the pooling indicator variable in col-
umn(1). This last fact suggests that part of the reason pooling boats are more
productive is because social preferences matter.
More speciﬁcally, in column (2) we see that the baseline eﬀect of conditional
cooperation on all boats is associated with a 0.625 standard deviation increase
in productivity (p < 0.01) and a further 0.569 standard deviation increase for
poolers (p = 0.12); however, the interaction term is not signiﬁcant at conven-
tional levels. At the same time, unconditional cooperation does not appear to
be robustly related to productivity even though the interaction term is large
and close to signiﬁcant. It is also interesting that the pooling indicator variable
is no longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero although the point estimate has not
changed. This suggests that the diﬀerential eﬀect of conditional cooperation
partially explains why poolers are more productive.
The results listed in column (3) indicate that the propensity to show dis-
approval when the others shirk is associated with a 0.340 standard deviation
increase in productivity (p < 0.01) and a further increase of 0.435 standard
deviations that accrues only to poolers (p < 0.10). In this case the addition
of social preference causes the pooling indicator to lose both signiﬁcance and
magnitude. This is further evidence that social preferences matter in general,
and in particular for poolers.
Interesting, the baseline eﬀect of one’s response to social disapproval (column
(4)) is negative indicating that those boats with participants that responded
more prosocially to disapproval actually produce less (p < 0.10). However this
result must be tempered by the fact that the pooling interaction coeﬃcient
is positive and of the same magnitude indicating that the eﬀect is attenuated
for poolers. The results are very similar for one’s unconditional response to
disapproval. Further, the pooling indicator again loses signiﬁcance and shrinks
somewhat.
The results in columns (1) through (4) are very encouraging, but how robust
are they? For example what if we do not assume that social preferences are
exogenous. In the previous section we argued that social preferences change as
predict any better.
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the ﬁshermen gain both general experience and speciﬁc experience with pooling.
It therefore can not be too hard to think of scenarios in which there is feedback,
for example, from productivity to social preference. In columns (5) through
(7) we control for this possibility by instrumenting for our social preference
measures.
Luckily our survey provided us with a number of variables that are highly
correlated with social preference but should be exogenous with respect to pro-
ductivity. One measure, highlighted in the previous section, is the Rotter score.
The Rotter score is highly correlated with all our social preference measures
(although it only shows up signiﬁcantly in three of the regressions in Table 3)
and therefore it must also be correlated with productivity. However, many pre-
vious studies have found no link between locus of control and productivity (e.g.,
Guion and Gibson, 1965; Szilagyi et al., 1976; Johnson et al., 1984; Hollenbeck
and Whitener, 1988; Blau, 1993). This suggests that the locus of control works
through social preference in our implementation.
22
We also used other variables
listed in Table 1 such as family size as instruments. Most of these variables are
not too hard to defend as instruments. For example, it is not obvious why
family size would aﬀect productivity directly if one realizes that the ﬁshermen
do not actually consume any of the ﬁsh they catch nor is it clear that ﬁshing
productivity will have a large eﬀect on one’s family size, especially for those
unmarried crew members who still live at home.
The instrumented production function estimates in columns (5) through (7)
actually reﬂect a stronger case for the importance of social preferences. Now all
the baseline eﬀects of social preference and all the pooling interactions eﬀects
are statistically signiﬁcant. In column (5) we see that conditional cooperation
improves eﬃciency overall, but poolers beneﬁt 0.819 standard deviations more
than nonpoolers, and unconditional cooperation has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
on productivity, but only for poolers. Column (6) is very similar to column (3)
in that it indicates that the propensity to disapprove is associated with produc-
tivity gains, but now the diﬀerential eﬀect on poolers has increased from 0.435
standard deviations to 0.685 standard deviations. Further, in column (7) we see
that the response to disapprove remains negatively associated with productivity
among nonpoolers, but the new estimate of the coeﬃcient on the pooling inter-
action is signiﬁcant and positive. In fact, the sum of the baseline and diﬀerential
eﬀects suggest that the response to punishment is, indeed, positively associated
with productivity for the poolers.
It is also important to note that each of the pooling indicator variables in
regressions (5) through (7) lose statistical signiﬁcance and magnitude when the
instrumented social preference measures are included. Therefore, we continue
to see that the diﬀerential impact of social preferences on the pooling boats
accounts for a substantial amount of their productivity advantage. Lastly, in
the bottom panel of Table 4 we report the Hausman test p-values from the
comparisons of the coeﬃcients in the instrumented and un-instrumented models.
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Additionally, because the test-retest reliability of the Rotter scale is relatively high we
can assume this personality measure is relatively stable.
18
These p-values suggest that endogeneity might have been a problem in two of
the three cases: conditional cooperation and the response to social disapproval.
8 Concluding Remarks
To summarize our results, we ﬁnd that student behavior in our voluntary con-
tribution experiment lacks external validity with respect to our second subject
pool, ﬁshermen who face the sort of social dilemma modeled by our experi-
mental protocol in their daily work lives. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that ﬁshermen
are signiﬁcantly more cooperative than students — a result that has become
a “stylized fact” of the ﬁeld experimental literature. Our second signiﬁcant
ﬁnding is that three of our ﬁve experimental measures of social preference (con-
ditional and unconditional cooperation, and response to social disapproval) are
endogenous to the adoption of a cooperative institution, under which boats pool
their ﬁshing eﬀorts. We ﬁnd that pooling experience attenuates a general de-
cay of social preference that aﬀects all ﬁshermen. Our third result is the most
important: we ﬁnd that experimental measures of social preference can be di-
rectly linked to ﬁshing productivity. Those crews that exhibit greater degrees of
conditional cooperation and the propensity to disapprove of shirking are more
productive. However, the baseline aﬀect of being more responsive to the disap-
proval of others appears to be a drag on productivity. Lastly, we have found that
social preferences contribute signiﬁcantly to explaining why pooling boats are
more productive than their nonpooling competitors. The poolers catch more,
not only because of institutionalized cooperative ﬁshing techniques, they catch
more because their stock of social preferences has a diﬀerential eﬀect on their
eﬀorts.
While simply ﬁnding a link between social preferences and productivity goes
a long way to bridging the gap between experiments and the economics main-
stream, it is also important to assess the magnitude of the social preference
eﬀects. Recall that the mean catch per unit of eﬀort among the ﬁshermen is
approximately 90 kilos. Poolers typically catch 0.4 standard deviations, or 30
kilos, more. The base line eﬀect of a standard deviation increase in conditional
cooperation is to increase the catch of all boats by 47 kilos. However, the dif-
ferential eﬀect of conditional cooperation on poolers is an additional 43 kilos.
Similar results for the other social preference measures can be calculated from
the standardized regression coeﬃcients in Table 4. The point, however, is that
social preferences do not only matter for the productivity of our ﬁshermen, they
matter a lot.
9 Appendix A: Experiment Instructions (back-
translations from Japanese)
Thank you very much for participating in the exercise today. You will be asked
to repeat the exercise 10 times. After that we request that you respond to a
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brief questionnaire.
In the experiment, you will earn money. The amount you will earn depends
on the decisions you and everyone else make during the exercises. This exper-
iment aims to study individual behavior when money is at stake, thus we will
use real money during the exercises. You will kep any money that you earn
during the experiment.
Any decisions you make in the exercises or responses you give in the ques-
tionnaire will be strictly conﬁdential. We will never tell anyone your responses
or choices. To assure your responses are conﬁdential, we ask you to not speak
to each other until the entire experiment is completed.
Rules of the exercise:
Please check to make sure that the following items are in front of you: A
pencil, instructions (this paper), and a large brown envelop.
The exercise will be repeated 10 times but a new rule will be applied for the
last 5 rounds. We will explain new rule before the 6th round.
You are a member of a group of four people: there are three other people
in the group with you. You will all stay in the same group for each of the 10
rounds.
To understand the exercise, imagine yourself in a situation where you have
to decide how to allocate resources intended for ﬁshing. You may allocate your
money to buy new ﬁshing equipment or to build a lighthouse. If you buy new
equipment, you will be able to increase your catch and income. If a lighthouse
is built, it will help increase the catch and income of all ﬁshers regardless of
whether they allocate money for building the lighthouse or not.
In the exercise, you will be asked to decide how much of your money to keep
and how much to allocate towards a group project.
At the beginning of each round, we will give you a white envelope with ten 50
yen coins inside. Each person in the group will then decide privately how many
of these 10 coins to allocate to the group project and how many to keep for him-
or herself. Everyone in the group beneﬁts equally from the money allocated to
the group project, but only you beneﬁt from the money you keep. Please put
the money you would like to keep in the brown envelop and return the rest that
you would like to allocate to the group project in the white envelop. We will
collect the white envelope. Please keep the brown envelop with you during the
experiment.
When all four members of the group have decided how many coins to allocate
to the group project, we will add up all the money from the four group members.
When we know the total, we will double it. Each person will then receive an
equal share of the doubled amount. Each person also keeps what ever money
he or she put in the large brown envelope.
Here is an example to illustrate how the experiment works. Each person
decides how much to allocate to the group project privately, so you will not
know what anyone else has decided when you make your choice. Suppose that
in the ﬁrst round everyone in your group, including yourself, allocate all 10 coins
to the group project. In total there are 10+10+10+10=40 coins in the group
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project. The group project will double this amount which makes the total 80
coins. Each of you then receives an equal share, i.e., 20 coins.
To continue the example, let us now suppose in the second round. Everyone
in the group receives another 10 coins at the beginning of the round. Imagine
that this time everyone in the group contributes no money to the group project.
In total there are 0+0+0+0=0 coin in the group project. Because nobody con-
tributes to the group project, nobody receives anything from the group project.
Each person’s earnings for round two are just the 10 coins that each person
kept.
Let’s continue the example for one more round. Now say that you allocate
nothing to the group project and the other three people in the same group
allocate everything to the group project. The group project will receive a total
of 0+10+10+10=30 coins. We double this amount which makes the total of 60
coins. Each person receives an equal share of the 60 coins, i.e., 15 coins from
the group project.
In the round 3 you would earn total of 25 coins (15 from the group project
plus the 10 you kept), while the other members will earn 15 coins from the
project.
After each round, you will be provided with a report that contains all four
members’ allocations to the group project in random order, the total number of
coins allocated to the project, and your share of income from the group project.
Please note that group members’ allocations are written in random order so
that it is impossible to identify who allocate how much money to the project.
The above is only an example. You will play 5 rounds and each of you
will decide, on your own, how to allocate the 10 coins that you receive at the
beginning of each round.
Are there any questions about how the experiment will proceed?
Rules for exercise 2 (only to be handed out after exercise 1 has been
completed)
Exercise 2 is very similar to exercise 1, but there will be one diﬀerence in
the procedures.
The ﬁrst part of each decision making round will be exactly the same as
exercise 1. There will be 5 decision making rounds and you will each receive
10 coins at the beginning of each round. You will decide privately how much
money to allocate to the group project and how much to keep. When everyone
in the group has made this decision, we will calculate the total contribution.
We will then double the total contribution. Each person will receive an equal
share of the doubled amount.
The only diﬀerence between exercise 1 and exercise 2 is that you will have
the possibility to send a message to the rest of your group. This is the message
you can send:
show “unhappy face”
You will be asked to ﬁll out an order form for an “unhappy face” after each
round. We will collect the order forms and count the number of “unhappy faces”
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ordered in each group. At the beginning of the next round, the white envelop
that you receive will have the number of unhappy face marks ordered by your
group on it.
Please note that ordering the “unhappy mark” will cost you 10 yen. When
you see stamps on your envelop, you know that some of the group members have
spent 10 yen each to tell the rest of the group that they are unhappy with the
amount that was allocated to the group project. Anyone who decides to send
this message will do so anonymously. Nobody will know who sent the messages.
Are there any questions about how the exercise will proceed?
10 Appendix B: Data Deﬁnitions
The Cooperation scale statements were: 1) “It is virtuous to compete;” 2) “It is
virtuous to cooperate;” 3) “One must reciprocate kindness;” 4) “People should
revenge wrongs done to them.” One’s score increased by one for agreeing with
2 and 3 and for disagreeing with 1 and 4. One’s score decreased by one for
agreeing with 1 and 4 and disagreeing with 2 and 3.
The Rotter score statements were: 1) “I believe my success depends on ability
rather than luck;” 2) “I dislike taking responsibility for making decisions;” 3)
“I make decisions and move on;” 4) “I believe that unfortunate events occur
because of bad luck;” 5) “I like to take responsibility for making decisions;” and
6) “I tend to analyze situations too much and therefore miss opportunities.”
Agreeing with statements 1, 3, and 5, and disagreeing with 2, 4, and 6 increased
one’s score by one point. Agreeing statements 2, 4, and 6, and disagreeing with
1, 3, and 5 reduced one’s score by one point.
Meet Other Fishermen is a likert scale response to the question “What do you
do when you meet your fellow ﬁshers?” Responses to this question include: 1) “I
often speak about myself;” 2) “I tend to listen to them;” 3) “I actively exchange
opinions with them;” and 4) “I rarely have conversations with them”. Scores of
zero to three were assigned to the statements 4, 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Consider Other Fishermen is a likert scale response to the question “How do you
consider your fellow ﬁshers?” Alternative responses to this questions were: 1) “I
consider my fellow ﬁshers as family members;” 2) “I consider them as friends;”
3) “I consider them as strangers,” and 4) “I consider them as competitors.”
Scores of two, one, zero and minus one were assigned to the statements 1, 2, 3,
and 4, respectively.
Interest in Other’s Catch is one’s responses to the question, “At the end of a
ﬁshing day, how keen are you to know how much the other ﬁshers catch?” The
responses are measured on a likert scale: scores of three, two, one and zero were
assigned to the responses, “very much;” “a little;” “not very much;” “not at
all,” respectively.
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11 Tables and Figures
Pooler Nonpooler Student
(N=14) (N=13) (N=26)
Family Size 3.78 (1.37) 5.61 (2.26) 4.92 (0.98)
Fishing Experience 21.86 (20.56) 28.15 (10.72) -
Cooperation Scale 1.07 (0.83) 0.38 (1.12) 0.38 (1.13)
Rotter Score 0.78 (1.62) -0.23 (1.88) 0.61 (2.02)
Meet Other Fishermen (quality of conversation) 2.57 (0.65) 2.25 (0.87)
Consider Other Fishermen (-1:Competitor, 0:Stranger, 
1:Friend, 2:Family)
0.71 (0.99) -0.58 (0.79) -
Interest in Other's Catch (0:None to 3:Much) 2.23 (0.44) 2.00 (0.82) -
Overall Contribution 5.14 (1.67) 4.59 (2.02) 3.15 (1.40)
Pre-Disapproval Contribution 5.07 (1.74) 4.80 (2.24) 3.33 (1.71)
Post-Disapproval Contribution 5.21 (2.11) 4.38 (1.94) 2.96 (1.57)
Social Disapproval 0.12 (0.19) 0.31 (0.34) 0.42 (0.98)
Demographics, Personality and Attitudes
Behavior
Table 1: Participant Summary Statistics
Note: (standard deviations)
(1) (2)
Pooler 2.950 2.261
[1.388]** [2.617]
Student -5.925 -6.269
[1.230]*** [2.429]***
Intercept 18.325 18.592
[0.982]*** [1.908]***
Group Level Random Effects? No Yes
rho, p-value 0.34, <0.01
Log Likelihood -486.725 -467.865
Observations 150 150
Table 2: Are there Group Level Differences in Contributions?
Note: Both regressions are Tobits; [standard errors]; *** indicates significant 
at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%.
(dependent variable is group total contribution in period t)
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Conditional 
Cooperation
Unconditional 
Cooperation
Propensity to 
Disapprove
Response to 
Disapproval
Unconditional 
Response
Pooler -1.169 1.086 -1.862 1.323 -1.260
[0.483]** [0.460]** [0.446]*** [0.653]* [0.598]**
Fishing Experience -1.416 1.437 -2.209 1.268 -0.798
[0.577]** [0.549]** [0.533]*** [0.780] [0.712]
Pooler × Experience 1.306 -1.270 2.172 -0.971 0.883
[0.608]** [0.579]** [0.562]*** [0.822] [0.752]
Skipper 0.571 -0.482 0.860 -0.551 0.259
[0.214]** [0.204]** [0.198]*** [0.290]* [0.265]
Rotter Score -0.388 0.204 0.585 -0.303 0.672
[0.190]* [0.181] [0.176]*** [0.257] [0.235]***
Cooperation Scale 0.007 0.001 -0.072 0.080 0.038
[0.167] [0.159] [0.154] [0.226] [0.207]
Consider Fishermen -0.068 0.226 -0.127 -0.293 0.188
[0.183] [0.174] [0.169] [0.247] [0.226]
Meet Fishermen 0.090 -0.100 -0.614 0.011 0.135
[0.183] [0.175] [0.169]*** [0.248] [0.227]
Adjusted R
2
0.42 0.32 0.57 0.03 0.28
Observations 25 25 25 25 25
Table 3: The Effect of Experience on Social Preference
Note: All regressions are OLS; Standardized regression coefficients reported; [standard errors]; *** indicates significant at 
1%, ** 5%, and * 10%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Production 
Function
Skipper's Experience (years as skipper) 0.973 2.390 2.147 1.663 2.855 2.990 1.895
[0.438]** [0.632]*** [0.572]*** [0.800]** [0.691]*** [0.987]*** [0.695]***
Skipper Experience
2
-0.830 -1.931 -1.577 -1.391 -2.241 -2.339 -1.606
[0.455]* [0.549]*** [0.483]*** [0.748]* [0.588]*** [0.821]*** [0.658]**
Crew Experience (boat mean) 0.138 0.252 -0.285 0.370 -0.281 -0.347 0.319
[0.119] [0.228] [0.241] [0.253] [0.372] [0.266]
[0.205]
+
Boat Horse Power 0.384 1.100 0.473 0.566 0.986 0.602 0.557
[0.144]*** [0.278]*** [0.162]*** [0.160]*** [0.268]*** [0.211]*** [0.161]***
Pool Revenues 0.404 0.403 0.258 0.366 -0.510 0.225 0.395
[0.151]*** [0.419] [0.209] [0.238] [0.732] [0.224] [0.236]*
Conditional Cooperation (boat mean) 0.625 0.676
[0.292]** [0.265]***
Unconditional Cooperation (boat mean) 0.172 0.383
[0.289]
[0.248]
+
Propensity to Disapprove (boat mean) 0.340 0.359
[0.107]*** [0.117]***
Response to Social Disapproval (boat mean) -0.276 -0.294
[0.154]* [0.151]**
Unconditional Response (boat mean) -2.207 -2.127
[0.935]** [0.921]**
Pool × Conditional Cooperation 0.569 0.819
[0.350]
+
[0.445]*
Pool × Unconditional Cooperation 0.818 1.623
[0.517]
+
[0.819]**
Pool × Propensity to Disapproval 0.435 0.685
[0.242]* [0.378]*
Pool × Response to Disapproval 0.255 0.329
[0.215] [0.182]*
Pool × Unconditional Response to Disapproval 1.870 1.840
[0.918]** [0.883]**
Includes fishing week fixed effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood -157.342 -149.359 -150.860 -149.882 -149.285 -140.955 -149.963
Hausman Test p-value 0.01 0.49 0.05
Observations 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Note: Standardized regression coefficients reported; All regressions are Tobits; *** indicates significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * 10%, and 
+
 15%.
Table 4:  The Determinants of Fishing Productivity
(dependent variable is standardized number of kilos caught per trip into the bay)
Production Function and Social Preferences
Production Function and Instrumented Social 
Preferences
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Figure 1: Contribution and Disapproval Time Paths.
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